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Introduction
Students of guardianship taking their first look at Bentham’s writings on the subject
might well ask themselves whether these explain guardian-ward relations better than
Blackstone’s earlier exposition.1 Bentham’s well-known antipathy towards
Blackstone may be part of the reason he felt it necessary to write on the same subject
and without acknowledgement of Blackstone (or any other regarded authority on the
subject). While no attempt is made at a point-by-point comparison between Bentham’s
views and Blackstone’s it is contended that what Bentham had to say on the subject
was of more importance.
Bentham’s treatment of guardianship is brief compared with his approach to
most other subjects but its succinctness is accompanied by clarity of exposition that
helps in drawing out main themes and arguments. It was nevertheless necessary in
writing this article to strike a balance between, on the one hand, commenting on
matters that seem implicit in Bentham’s account or which seemed logically to
follow a particular statement as against, on the other hand, speculating about what
Bentham would have said had he discussed the subject at greater length. It was,
however, judged appropriate to conjecture at some points on the influence of
Bentham’s views on subsequent developments and contemporary issues.
A central proposition implicit in Bentham’s account was that guardianship is
beneficial to wards. We do not know whether ‘benefit’ carried an aspirational
meaning or if Bentham was simply ‘speaking as he found’, i.e., of the situation as
he appraised it. We do not have evidence of benefits that wards actually gained, i.e.
collected data or factual accounts of actual persons’ experience. Nor do we glean an
idea of the time factor: was ‘benefit’ assumed to be a constant or was it a variable that
might apply in different degrees and different stages of the relation? In the absence of
1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England , 4 vols., Oxford, 1765-9, vol. 1, pp. 461-66.
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evidence of these kinds, a different approach to evaluation is required. What is
attempted here therefore is an appraisal of the integrity and intention behind
Bentham’s assertion of benefit. Did these assertions alongside his other ideas provide
a firm foundation upon which beneficial outcomes could be predicted?
This presentation firstly brings together and summarises Bentham’s main
statements on guardianship that are contained in his Writings on the Civil Code and from
An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation . Brief reference is also
made to Of Laws in General. The article then proceeds to discuss the key issues and
questions to which these statements give rise, setting the scene for a consideration of
Bentham’s major contribution to the subject: the special elements of the guardian-
ward relation at the heart of the guardianship concept. The discussion of guardian-
ward relations that follows considers key elements in the relation under four headings:
Trust and Protection, Agency and Representation, Power Dimensions and
Fiduciary Dimensions. No attempt is made to review the substantial bodies of literature
on these subjects that have accumulated since Bentham’s time. The task is confined to
explaining their part in identifying the features that distinguish guardian-ward
relations from others.
Bentham’s main statements
Generally speaking, Bentham maintains, we are the best judges of our own best
interests: ‘For who should know so well as you do what it is that gives you pain or
pleasure?’2 Putative wards’ lack of ‘knowledge, inclination and physical power prevents
these persons securing their own wellbeing, furthering their own best interests and
achieving the happiness that others gain through their own efforts.3 Wards are
perceived as intellectually or motivationally ‘deficient’ through young age or mental
disorder. These two conditions apply respectively:
1. Where a man’s intellect is not yet arrived at that state which it is
capable of directing his own inclination in the pursuit of happiness; this
is the case of infancy.
2 An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation , ed. J. H. Burns and H. L. A. Hart, Oxford,
1996 (CW), (henceforth IPML (CW)), p. 244.
3 Ibid., p. 244.
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2. Where by some particular known or unknown circumstance his
intellect has either never arrived at that state, or having arrived at it has
fallen from it; which is the case of insanity.4
In describing guardianship as part of, or as an adjunct to, family relationships called ‘a
trust of a private nature’5 or ‘domestic magistracy’.6 Bentham seemed to mainly have
in mind younger wards ‘living within the compass of the same family’.7 From a wider
purview, Bentham located guardian-ward relations in a class of superior-subordinate
relations consisting of two categories that are distinguished by whether they benefit
the superior or the subordinate. Guardian-ward relations benefit the ward, viz.: ‘A
guardian is one who is invested with power over another[...] called a ward; the power
being exercised for the benefit of the ward’.8 And further, ‘If it be for the sake of the
inferior that the power is established, then the superior is termed a guardian; and
the inferior his ward’.9
The role of guardians is likened to that of trustees, persons entrusted to ensure
that wards benefit by giving them the best chance of attaining ‘the greatest quantity of
happiness which his faculties, and the circumstances he is in, will admit of’.10 This
aim is realised by procurement;11 through ensuring wards are protected;12 and,
implicitly, by representing their interests. The guardian’s over-riding obligation is to
further the interests of the ward in a way the ward would have done him/herself had
he/she been able. A guardian’s ‘power [...] thereby coupled with a trust, may be
termed a fiduciary one’.13
Exercising powers of control of the person of the ward may also entail control of
the ward’s property. Bentham defines such property as ‘ [...] things [i.e., objects, upon
4 Bentham’s reference to ‘insanity’ is taken to include both ‘learning disability’ and ‘mental illness’. The
present writer’s use of the term ‘mental disorder’ also applies both to learning disability and mental illness
unless otherwise indicated.
5 Ibid., p. 248.
6 ‘Principles of the Civil Code’, in The Works of Jeremy Bentham, ed. J. Bowring, 11 vols., Edinburgh and
London, 1843 (Henceforth Bowring), i. p. 348.
7 IPML (CW), p. 244.
8 Ibid., p. 244.
9 Ibid., p. 288
10 Ibid., p. 246.
11 Ibid., p. 247.
12 Bowring, i. p. 347.
13 IPML (CW), p. 238.
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the use of which] a man’s happiness depends[...]’14 i.e. not just a collection of
‘things’ but what is personally important to the ward. Bentham is adamant that a
guardian’s remit does not extend to third parties or their property, viz.: ‘ [...]
guardianship, being a trust of a private nature, does not, as such, confer upon the
trustee any power [...] other than [towards] the beneficiary himself’.15
As to how long guardianship should last, the general principle Bentham
conveyed was that guardianship would cease once a ward was ‘exhibiting the
quantity of intelligence which is sufficient for the purposes of self-government’.16
Guardianships for mentally disordered wards should last until such a person ‘be of
sound mind and understanding’.17 However, for youngsters Bentham said it was
necessary to presume that after a certain period all these wards should be deemed to be
independent, i.e. self-governing. As to where this line should be drawn, Bentham
thought responsibility rested with the ‘legislators to cut the gordian knot’18 and
determine that such a guardianship should cease when the ward ‘arrives at full age’.19
An alternative prescription Bentham put forward was that ‘Provision may be made
[for those] who never reach maturity, or reach it much later than others [...] by
interdiction, which is only (sic) a prolongation of guardianship during a prolonged
childhood’.20
Issues and questions raised
The issues and questions raised by Bentham’s account discussed below are: how
Bentham perceived the objective of guardianship; its legal and ethical basis; what
process was involved and over what time-span; the characteristics of wards and how
they were likely to benefit, including implications of the person and property
distinction; and questions as to the identity and capabilities of guardians.
Bentham’s view of guardianship seems to be that of an institution in which the
relation between guardians and wards is prescribed and regulated, though the nature or
adequacy of specific contemporaneous regulations is not evidenced. Bentham did not
14 Ibid., pp. 247-48.
15 Ibid., p. 248.
16 Ibid., p. 245.
17 Ibid., p. 246.
18 Ibid., p. 245
19 The age of legal maturity in England was twenty-one, a figure Bentham endorsed in Principles of the
Civil Code, Bowring, i. p. 348.
20 Ibid., p. 348.
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dwell on wider questions about guardianship’s purpose, but we may confidently
assume that he viewed guardianship no differently to other areas of public policy,
namely that it should seek to increase the happiness of the populace, by reducing pain
and increasing pleasure. To achieve this goal required that wards be afforded
protection and representation, the overall task of guardians.
An area of uncertainty is whether Bentham saw guardianship as directed
exclusively at furthering the interests of individuals, in this case guardians’ wards, or
whether he envisaged it dealing directly or indirectly with a problematic section of
society as a step towards attaining greater overall community or national happiness.
This, he may have argued, would be consequential upon having well ordered and
regulated guardianship laws and acceptable ethical standards in place.
Contemporary discussions of guardianship usually proceed by reference to
prevailing statutory frameworks and/or to specific statutes, or such references may be
implicit. Bentham may well have discussed these had he offered a fuller account but
it seems also have been the case that his idea of guardianship was much wider and
more inclusive than that contained in the legislation. He was less concerned with legal
definition than with ethical behaviour and relationships within and beyond the
family. Bentham stressed the need to apply moral principles; ethical
considerations should inform the law, taking precedence over legal detail and there
should be clear-cut practical applications. Overall it could be said the Bentham’s
approach was what we might now term a social policy perspective on what people
need and can realistically expect from others given normal ethical behaviour and the
existing statutory framework.
Bentham’s insistence that legal codes were enforced, and that remedies for
breach and related criminal acts or omissions were in place, show his commitment to the
place of the law in providing protection in its widest sense. We are left to wonder,
however, how these requirements applied specifically to guardianship without cross-
reference to the state of contemporary guardianship law or enforcement
requirements. For example, was Bentham sufficiently confident in the
effectiveness of the machinery of compliance such that situations of defaulting or
exploitative guardians would not arise or could be effectively dealt with? The
example quoted later (under Trust and Protection) of wards needing protection from
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guardians suggests cause for concern in this respect.
Bentham identifies the power base of guardianship as belonging to a subcategory
of ‘power of imperation’ called ‘private dominion’ power and described as: ‘ [...] the
power which the master exercises over the will of his servant, the parent over that of his
child, the guardian over that of his ward’.21 Elsewhere, Bentham discusses ‘relations of
a legal kind which can be superinduced upon [...] natural relations’.22 The legal aspect
of domestic relations, he explains, implies imposition of obligations; and the enactment
of legal obligations within the family requires enforceable powers and rights.23 It was
from this position that he approached the correlative connection between guardian and
ward as combining fiduciary and power relations—discussed later under Power
Dimensions and Fiduciary Dimensions.
To appreciate how Bentham envisaged individual guardianships progressing
over time would have been made easier had he called for a general ruling as to how
long guardianships were expected to last, such as the dictum that this was until the
ward achieved independence. However, the different rule for youngsters (fixed
closure point at age twenty-one) provided no means to insure these wards had
progressed sufficiently towards independence by this time. Presumably Bentham saw
interdiction proceedings (prolongation of guardianship where achieving
independence is unlikely) as a way round this difficulty so as to provide for youngsters
who were clearly failing to progress to that stage, thereby enabling guardians to continue
their relationship with wards where necessary beyond age twenty-one.
The effect of adopting interdiction measures could have been to bring termination
expectations in line with those applicable to mentally disordered wards, namely that
guardianships last till no longer needed. This is now a widely accepted principle
endorsed also on a general conceptual level. Hiz, for example, applies the dictum by
analogy to educators and doctors as guardians vis- à-vis their pupils and patients
(respectively), pointing out that responsibilities appropriately cease when their pupils
successfully complete their studies and when their patients are fully recovered.24
Interdiction also raises questions about guardianships of indefinite duration as
21 Of Laws in General, ed. H. L. A. Hart, London, 1970 (CW), p. 138n.
22 IPML (CW), p. 206.
23 Ibid., pp. 236/7.
24 H. Hiz, ‘The Ethics of a Guardian and the Ethics of a Legislator’, The Philosophical Forum, xxix.
(1998).
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might apply, for example, to persons with severe learning disability requiring long-
term if not life-long support and care and where an objective of enabling the person to
attain a degree of happiness independently is unrealistic. If interdiction measures could
provide for a form of indefinite guardianship that ruled out or discounted any prospect
or intention of conclusion the result would be more like a form of alternative parenting.
The effect would be to render the basis of guardianship for youngsters
indistinguishable to that of adoption under child law. It is ironic, therefore, that a form of
‘special guardianship’ has now been introduced to accommodate long-term
(indefinite) care of youngsters short of full assumption of parental responsibility by
adoptive parents.25
Turning to the question of which groups of people Bentham perceived
guardianship as being intended for, we note that he identifies putative wards as
youngsters and mentally disordered persons of limited intellectual capacity. Bentham
was probably of the same opinion as most of his contemporaries at least in this respect in
paying high regard for self-determination and personal autonomy. Therefore he would
also have perceived the main way wards were ‘deficient’ was in having limited
autonomy and therefore requiring another to decide and act on their behalf, hence the
need for a guardian. To these limitations of wards Bentham added the inability to achieve
the happiness that others achieve by their own efforts, suggesting that motivational
and possibly health related problems could stand in their way as well as intellectual
limitations.
‘Happiness’ in Bentham’s terms means ‘enjoyment of pleasures, security from
pain’ and this might well describe some expected direct or indirect gains from
guardianship.26 Being well protected and represented by guardians could be the
formula that ensures such gains are realised and maintained. The expression
‘knowledge, inclination and physical power’, used by Bentham to describe qualities
lacking in wards, also points towards important sources of happiness that could be
encouraged or frustrated. The words themselves may also suggest a three-
dimensional way of considering persons’ wellbeing and it is notable that one of the
most readily usable modes of modern analysis, that provided by May, similarly
distinguishes between the person as an individual, the person as a social being and the
25 Sections 1 4A to 1 4G added to Children Act, 1989, by Section 115, Adoption and Children Act, 2002.
26 IPML (CW), p. 74.
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person as a physical body.27 May’s analysis also follows Bentham in helping to identify
ways of achieving happiness as well as pinpointing obstacles that may stand in its way.
Goodin takes May’s approach a stage further in identifying the main impediment to
achieving happiness as the vulnerability that arises from a person’s limitations in one
or more of these aspects of his/her life and dependence on another to compensate for
these.28 The fiduciary concept as articulated by Bentham helps to explain why a special
relation is required to combat a person’s vulnerability.
A notable effect of the way Bentham brings together youngsters and mentally
disordered persons together as the group for whom guardianship was intended is that
the ‘deficiency’ of underdeveloped or diminished intellect is a perceived as a common
denominator. In so doing he effectively identifies a ‘generic’ identity of prospective
wards and thereby made substantial progress over Blackstone’s account that only
considered the position of children. Even so, it is notable that Bentham pays less
attention to the situation of mentally disordered and/or older persons than to
youngsters. It is difficult, for instance, to think of the needs (let alone the
happiness) of these persons without at the same time considering the role of
institutional care. We do not know whether Bentham perceived such forms of care as
alternatives to or as complementing guardianship, though we may presume that it was
only the least disordered who remained at home subject to guardianship.
Following on from questions about the characteristics of wards it would be instructive
to ask how putative wards were selected or whether there were recognised ‘triggers’ or
‘starting points’, i.e. particular situations or circumstances, that would lead to
guardianship being initiated for these persons. It seems safe to assume, however, that
Bentham understood that whatever process was in place required proper procedures
and careful consideration because it was these procedures that provided necessary
safeguards against blanket judgements inappropriately or hastily applied. Bentham
would have been well aware that such judgements could contribute to the
perpetuation of social ills such as when persons were deemed incapable of knowing
their own best interests for the benefit of others, as in the case of forced child labour
and in the unjustified compulsory incarceration of mentally ill people.
27 R. May, ‘Contributions of Existential Psychotherapy’ in Existence: A New Dimension in Pschiatry and
Psychology, ed. R. May, E. Angel, H. F. Ellenberger, New York, 1958.
28 R. E. Goodin, Protecting the Vulnerable, London, 1985.
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As against the difficulty of determining whether wards benefited from
guardianship in the way Bentham seemed to assume, some specific ways he
expected wards to gain can be stated, namely in receiving protection of their
persons and property and by representation of their interests. He also refers to
procuration as an undefined benefit from guardianship that, we may surmise, covered
the various kinds of practical help, including material gain, which guardians could
secure for wards. As to protection of wards’ property it appears that Bentham accepted
that the person and property distinction had practical significance so that for the
protection of children’s inheritance, for example, there could even be circumstances
requiring the appointment of two guardians, each representing two sets of interests –
wards’ persons, on the one hand, and their property, on the other.29 We might wonder,
however, whether Bentham would have approved of the almost complete separation
of ‘guardianship of the person’ and ‘guardianship of the estate/affairs/finances’ into
the distinct forms of guardianship that have since become commonplace.30
Bentham’s exposition suggests that he was inclined to view person and
property as ‘two sides of a coin’ in so far as their protection contributed to
achieving the happiness of wards. This being so, Bentham may well have been
critical of legal thinking that can appear impersonal and only concerned with questions
of ownership and title. His references to pretium affectionis in several of his works
suggests that he would have recognised how deeply people feel about their
property, not necessarily connected with material value, and the degree of emotional
attachment revealed when items are stolen or defiled during burglaries.
Moving on to discuss questions about the characteristics of guardians (other
than parent guardians), we ask whether these were persons with particular skills or
experience and what may have been their main tasks and functions.31 It would seem that
guardians’ competence was presumed because these were persons ably fulfilling a
number of other socially important roles (further discussed under The Power
29 Bowring, i. p. 347.
30 The Law Commission’s recommendation that guardian of the estate for children be abolished
(Guardianship and Custody, Report No. 172, 1988, Section 2. 24) was not adopted at the passing of the
Children Act, 1989, though its scope was effectively limited to a function of the Official Solicitor in
certain narrowly defined circumstances (N.Lowe & G.Douglas, Bromley’s Family Law, Oxford, 2007, p.
439.
31 Questions that Bentham’s account raises as to similarities and differences between guardian- ward
and parent-offspring relations are not discussed in this paper but are considered in a further article in
course of preparation.
UCL Bentham Project
Journal of Bentham Studies, vol. 11 (2009)
10
Dimension). Whether some of their status and kudos was derived from proven abilities
as guardians is a matter of conjecture. It might be assumed that major changes have
occurred since Bentham’s time by which the guardians’ role would have become
increasing professionalised. However, Hiz’s contemporary discussion of the ethics of
guardianship interestingly focuses not on professional guardians but on doctors and
educators who he regards as good examples of persons who capably fulfil the
guardian role.32
In considering how Bentham expected guardians to respond to wards’ needs and
difficulties this would presumably include taking remedial or ameliorative action that
would hopefully improve wards’ situations. At the very least, Bentham would have
expected guardians to provide an influential and constructive role model to young
wards, one which would encourage them to find their own ways of seeking greater
happiness, while being ready to offer them guidance and, where necessary,
authoritative direction. It is less easy to speculate as to how Bentham expected guardians
to fulfil their responsibilities towards elderly and mentally disordered persons in an
era in which institutional care played a major role.
It would be interesting to know whether Bentham envisaged guardians
confronting wards’ ‘deficiencies’ solely through attending to personal factors rather
than addressing the social circumstances in which they lived. Guardians would
probably experience considerable difficulty grappling with individual examples of
poor housing, lack of employment or poverty and it seems that for the most part
Bentham expected social problems to be addressed not through the one-to- one form of
guardian-ward relation but through the operation of a National Charity Company.33
An issue that still remains unresolved is whether guardians ideally function in a
free-standing capacity, thereby being fully accountable to wards or, as has become
increasingly the case with guardians employed by social welfare agencies, guardians
owing primary allegiance to others. It seems certain that Bentham would have favoured
the free-standing position because the fiduciary nature of the relation he envisaged
(discussed under The Fiduciary Dimension) suggests that accountability elsewhere
would compromise guardians’ integrity. Modern managerial assumptions about
32 Hiz, ‘Ethics of a Guardian’.
33 See M. Quinn, ‘The Fallacy of Non-Interference: The Poor Panopticon and Equality of
Opportunity’, Journal of Bentham Studies , i (1997).
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efficient performance convey the need for ‘in-line’ organisational accountability, but the
notion that this ensures sufficiently high standards of guardians’ performance at least
towards elderly wards in care homes has been questioned.34
Essential elements of the guardian-ward relation
The above discussion, albeit speculative in some respects, has hopefully
demonstrated that at the heart of Bentham’s conception of guardianship was the
relation of guardian and ward, i.e., two persons correlatively connected by their
specific roles and statuses. His statements about the nature of the relation express a
number of concepts—trust, power, fiduciary, procuration, interdiction – some of
these in combination, and part of the task of the following analysis entails separating
their meanings and relating them to other concepts that Bentham either did not
discuss or which he gave less attention: protection, representation, agency, authority
and empowerment.
There is no explicit distinction in Bentham’s account between the protective and
representational roles for guardians. We are therefore not sure whether he perceived
guardian-ward relations as containing two distinct facets: trustee-beneficiary
relations that afford protection and agent- principal type relations that provide
personal representation. It is nevertheless argued that these concepts are implicit in his
discussion of guardians’ roles, the two functions being enjoined within guardianship by
the fiduciary dimension. The two functions that Bentham effectively merged are
discussed separately.
It is also argued that these functions together with their respective rationales
provide a clearer and more precise description of guardians’ responsibilities than those
offered by Blackstone (‘protection’, ‘maintenance’ and ‘education’).35 This was
demonstrated by Buti who found that in order to complete Blackstone’s list realistically
he needed to add: ‘discipline and punishment’; ‘domicile, access and visitation’; and
‘affection and emotional support’.36 The following argues that all these responsibilities
(with the exception of the questionably appropriate punitive aspect) are subsumed
under protection and representation provided these are fully pursued and
34 L. A. Frolik, ‘Elder Abuse and Guardians of Elderly Incompetents’, Journal of Elder Abuse &
Neglect, ii (1991), pp. 35-46.
35 Blackstone, Commentaries, p. 461.
36 A. D. Buti, Separated, Sydney, 2004.
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undertaken within a fiduciary relation , the latter element being Bentham’s main forte
and the one most conspicuously absent from Blackstone’s account.
Later commentators have sought to convey the dynamics of guardians’ roles
based on ‘developmental’ or ‘therapeutic’ models of guardianship.37 For present
purposes, these mainly serve to highlight that any statement that portrays a purely
static view of guardians’ functions and fails to stress that guardians have to adapt their
roles to the changing needs and situations of wards needs to be challenged. This
message is implicit in the following and is fully illustrated in the section on Power
Dimensions.
Trust and protection
Protective functions seemingly stem from what Bentham describes as the trust basis
for guardianship, i.e. guardians entrusted to protect their wards’ person and property
and being assured of actually gaining that protection. The idea that guardian-ward
relations are akin to trustee-beneficiary relations does not mean that they depend on
the formation of a trust in a technical (legal) sense. It was the ethical concept of trust—
the idea of a trust as a form of bond or agreement between persons – that was almost
certainly what Bentham and later commentators had in mind as a basis for guardian-
ward relations. Hiz, an example of a contemporary observer, considers mutual trust
between the parties as a quintessential guardianship attribute.38
Bentham talks more of wards’ need for security than for protection perse in
IPML but his discussion in the Civil Code is specific, commencing with the need
to protect children.39 Seemingly Bentham had some doubt as to how effective
guardians could be as protectors of their wards given the social conditions of the time
and at one point even suggested that wards might need protection from guardians.
The simplest way to avoid guardians abusing their position by, for example,
misappropriating a child’s estate ‘[...]is to allow any person to act in legal matters as
the friend of the infant against (sic) his guardians’.40 It would be interesting to know
whether Bentham considered guardians who abused their position in such ways would
37 L. A. Frolik, ‘Plenary Guardianship: An Analysis, A Critique and a Proposal for Reform’, Arizona
Law Review, xxiii (1981).
38 Hiz, ‘Ethics of a Guardian’.
39 Bowring, i. p. 347.
40 Ibid., p. 348.
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automatically loose their ‘superior’ standing, but see discussion under Power
Dimensions regarding Bentham’s use of ‘superior’ and ‘inferior’ terminology.
Situations such as the one described above might suggest some scepticism on
Bentham’s part as to how much trust could realistically be vested in guardians but for
the most part his account supports the view that trust relations between guardian and
ward are the basis for ensuring that protective intentions translate into protective reality,
both for the ward him/herself and for his/her property. How he perceived trust relations
in general is shown in his definition of trusts:
A trust is, where there is any particular act which one party, in the
exercise of some power, or some right, which is conferred on him, is
bound to perform for the benefit of another. Or, more fully, thus: A
party is said to be invested with a trust, when being invested with a
power, or with a right, there is a certain behaviour which, in the exercise
of that power, or of that right, he is bound to maintain for the benefit of
some other party. 41
Bentham stresses that a trust is only appropriately so named if and when the person
actually (i.e. demonstrably) receives or enjoys its benefit(s), and to mark this
distinction he prefers the title ‘beneficiendary’ to the more conventional
‘beneficiary’.42 Perhaps this caveat contains the residue of any lingering scepticism
that Bentham may have felt.
Bentham’s discussion of the meaning of ‘power’ and ‘right’ in this context
observes (not without misgivings about the terms themselves) ‘that a power was a
faculty, and that a right was a privilege’.43 This is taken to mean that persons
appointed as trustees are ‘privileged’ (i.e., gain kudos socially by being entrusted to
fulfil this role) and that their ‘faculty’ was that they were authorised as legally and
personally capable, i.e. ‘accredited’, to carry out such responsibilities as would fulfil
the beneficiary’s requirements and thereby comply with the terms of the trust.
Reference to trustees’ powers would therefore seem to mean ‘accreditation
41 IPML (CW), pp. 205-7.
42 Ibid., p. 208 n.
43 Ibid., p. 207 n.
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powers’, i.e. powers better described as obligatory responsibilities. A key distinction is
that such powers invested in trustees are not exercised within power relations perse
but flow from being authorised to act, etc., without corresponding to or depending
upon reciprocation from/by the other party. By contrast, reciprocation on the part of
a ward, express or implied, would necessarily be the case with exercise of
representational powers, as in the agency relation discussed later.
It is initially difficult to reconcile Bentham’s view of trust law with its modern
counterpart, much of which is subsumed into areas of business and financial
management. While now mainly providing a legally secure means of safeguarding
property in a person’s estate in order for it to be made available to present or future
beneficiaries, the relation of trustee-beneficiary remains the essential means by which
this is assured and trust law provides important safeguards to maintain the integrity of
trustees.
The understated but essential protective role of guardians as trustees stems from
their formal responsibility for ensuring that sufficient safeguards are in place to stand
the best chance of realising the trust’s objectives; and, so far as provision within the
trust allows, to ensure that beneficiaries actually gain and that the gain is in their
own best interests. Conversely, any relation based on one party protecting another is
only viable if the ‘protectee’ trusts the protector, allowing for the fact that younger or
more mentally disordered wards may not be able to experience or express trust
between themselves and others.
Bentham’s perception of guardian-ward relations as a trust relation provides a
link between the legal and social aspects of his thinking. Not only should the law of
guardian and ward be based in part on trustee–beneficiary relations, the need for trust is
upheld as the necessary basis of the relation in its ordinary ethical sense. The nub of
the trust concept in both senses is the obligations and responsibilities of trustees to do
whatever is necessary to fulfil the objectives and terms of the trust.
Agency and representation
Pitkin’s review of various meanings of ‘representation’ includes’ [...] the idea of
taking care of or looking after the interests or welfare of another’.44 In practice this
44 H.F. Pitkin, The Concept of Representation, Berkely, 1967, p. 141.
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requires an arrangement or understanding between parties such that a relationship
exists whereby one person’s primary sets of interests, wishes/aspirations, intentions,
life goals, etc., are ‘taken on’, in total or in part, i.e. by another. The rationale for the
choice of guardians to fulfil this role would be that they were the persons most likely
to be able to realise these goals and to do so better than wards could do alone.
Set against this position is Pitkin’s earlier argument that guardians are no
more the representatives of their wards than are headmasters of their pupils or parents
of their children.45 The critical difference here, however, is that headmasters and
parents have interests of their own to represent; they have their own agendas that not
only differ from, but could be in conflict with, those of their pupils/children.
Guardians, on the other hand, following Bentham’s line, have a fiduciary relation with
their wards that places the needs/interests of the ward before those of the guardian,
further discussed under Fiduciary Dimensions below.
There is no direct evidence that Bentham perceived guardians as
representatives of their wards in this sense although, as his own analysis showed,
their need for representation is self-evidently even greater than for those able to
pursue their own interests. We may speculate that his thinking on the subject differed
little (in this respect at least) from that of Hobbes who said that persons who were
not mentally or otherwise capable could not themselves authorise another to represent
their interests.46 These included persons Bentham identified as candidates for
guardianship.
We may further surmise that any suggestion that such needs could or should
become rights enshrined within guardianship would have been resisted by Bentham,
sceptical as he was of the value of furthering peoples’ rights, at least when defined as
natural entitlements. A connected consideration relates to his views on a different kind
of representation, the franchise, which were basically that women, children and
mentally disordered persons were not capable of voting with any degree of
intelligence and should not be enfranchised.47
Set against these considerations is another side to Hobbes’ argument, as
45 Ibid., p.30.
46 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, London, 1914, p. 85.
47 M. James, ‘Bentham’s Democratic Theory at the Time of the French Revolution’, Bentham Newsletter, x
(1986), p. 11 .See also Constitutional Code (CW), vol. 1, ed. F. Rosen and J. H. Burns, Oxford, 1983,
Ch. V, § 1, p. 29.
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articulated by Pitkin; that authorisation for other persons to represent people without
capacity is possible provided it comes from ‘outside’, i.e., from a third party.48 This
source is what we would naturally identify as the bedrock of guardians’ authority, i.e.,
the Sovereign.49 It seems certain that Bentham would have viewed the Crown in this
light as well as the one ultimately responsible for ensuring guardianship law was
properly implemented, breaches dealt with, etc. Conceivably, Bentham wanted his
straightforward and ‘down to earth’ account to be free of any esoteric rationale or
philosophy, and might have perceived notions of Parens Patria and the Crown as
‘guardian of guardians’ in this light, i.e. as ‘fictions’ that might obscure rather than
clarify guardians’ roles.
Bentham would surely have approved of guardians acting for or making
decisions on wards’ behalf and in their interests, central features of the
representational function. If he was reluctant to invoke the Royal Prerogative as
ultimate authority he might have looked instead at agency law to authorise guardians
to fulfil these roles. Agents, unlike trustees, have a representational role but their
authority to fulfil this comes from their principals.50 In the absence of capacity to give
such authority, other legal means are needed and it is precisely this ‘gap’ in the law
that guardianship could fill. A possible reason Bentham did not discuss agency law,
its limitations and how guardianship law could overcome these is that agency law was
at that time under-developed with principal-agent relations mainly associated with one
particular and quite different set of relations, namely those of master and servant
further discussed below.51
Another way in which guardianship law could have developed from Bentham’s
position regarding wards who by definition lacked capacity would be to give
guardians powers to decide or act on wards’ behalf without explicit endorsement
when wards’ present circumstances or previous wishes could reasonably be
interpreted as implied agreement. This ‘substituted judgement’ basis upon which to
safeguard wards’ interests could be deemed an expression of the fiduciary relation.
It is not suggested here that Bentham envisaged developments that explicitly
48 Pitkin, Representation, p. 23.
49 By ‘Sovereign’ in this context Bentham, a republican, would have meant whatever form of government
pertains.
50 Ibid., p. 130.
51 O. W. Holmes, ‘Agency’ in Collected Legal Papers, New York, 1952, p. 50.
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followed either of these paths. What is asserted is that his formulation paved the way
for such developments and on this basis alone and we are justified in referring to this
henceforth as the agency basis for guardian-ward relations.
Power dimensions
As indicated above, Bentham describes the legal basis of guardians’ ‘powers of
control’ as coming within the ‘private dominion’ subcategory of imperation powers.
He then divided private dominion powers into two further classes – ‘beneficiary’ and
‘fiduciary’ powers. These Bentham illustrated by contrasting master-servant relations
with guardian–ward relations. In master-servant relations, he identifies masters as the
‘superior’ party and as being the prime gainers from it; masters are said to exercise a
beneficiary power over servants. In relations of guardian and ward, on the other hand,
wards are the ‘inferior’ party but are presumed to be prime gainers from it. Guardians
exercise a fiduciary power.
Bentham’s use of terms ‘superior’ and ‘inferior’ might suggest that he
considered guardianship to be an institution with a built-in status difference between
guardians and wards. However, Bentham’s contention was probably that these terms
spelt out the critically important power difference between persons, albeit differences
that may well have a social class basis (other than where guardian-ward relations were
located within the same family). From this standpoint the power of ‘superior’
persons was likely to be derived from their elevated position in society from which
they had acquired authority. Such persons were able to use power relations primarily
to serve their own interests. Conversely, ‘inferior’ persons occupied lower social
status, were relatively ‘powerless’, and so tended to be on ‘the receiving end’ of power
relations. The point of departure for guardian-ward relations, is the reversal of the
notion of ‘benefit’: guardians are relatively powerful compared with wards but are
obligated to use their power ‘over’ wards not to serve their own interests but to further
those of wards.
With these points in mind, Bentham’s argument might be restated thus: the
rationale (or ‘purpose’) behind master-servant relations is primarily for the gain of
masters exercising power beneficial to their own interests. In guardian-ward relations,
wards are the intended primary benefit gainers. The guardian’s exercise of ‘fiduciary’
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power gives priority to serving the interests of the ward. However, we would surely
now need to add a rider to this formulation, namely that the viability of both (if not
all) sets of interpersonal relations depends in the long run on each party gaining
some benefit. What guardians themselves would gain is discussed in the section on
Fiduciary Dimensions.
Whilst Bentham would no doubt have emphasised that the consequential effect
of relations is their key rationale, his stress on the notion of ‘benefit’ could realistically
only have referred to purpose or intention since, as above indicated, there were no
means available to know whether benefit was actually gained by wards. Warnock
speaks approvingly of Bentham’s ‘celebrated “calculus” for measuring pleasures and
pains’ but it is doubtful whether this would help us judge (consequentially) whether
the guardian-ward relation per se contributed beneficially in this sense.52 Without
documented accounts of experiences of wards and guardians any evidential base
could only be hypothetical and is not further discussed.
The advantage of considering purposeful connections between powerless and
powerful persons is that it enables us to speak of a power relation the purpose,
objective or effect of which is realised because of the power difference between the
parties. This also helps in envisaging a shifting ‘balance of power’ occurring in the
relation over time. A problem with the way Bentham presents his account is that it
conveys a static view of these relations in which guardians’ exercise fiduciary power
‘over’ wards in a permanently benign manner. It seems inconceivable, however that
he would not have accepted that passage of time alone can change the ‘shape’ of
relations not least because guardians would exercising power in different ways.
It is not difficult to envisage scenarios to illustrate this point. A particular
guardian-ward relation could start with a compulsory imposition but proceed
towards a power-sharing state as and when the ward gains confidence in the
guardian’s best intentions and competence. A reverse pattern in the exercise of power
could apply in the case of a ward whose mental state deteriorates to a point where
he/she is unwilling to receive necessary help without the use of coercion.
The main way different types of power relations have been conceptualised is by
distinguishing Imposed Power (‘Power Over’) and Empowerment (‘Power To’).53
52 M. Warnock, ‘Introduction’ to J.S. Mill, Utilitarianism, ed. M. Warnock, London, 1962, p. 19.
53 S. Lucas, Power, London, 1974, pp. 28-31.
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Although Bentham’s formulation mainly conforms to the first of these, there seems
little doubt that he would have recognised the need for guardians to empower their
wards.
In power relations referred to here as Imposed Power, the more powerful
person exercises dominance over the less powerful person. This involves not so much
a question of ‘who benefits?’ from a relation of this kind but on whose terms the
relation is conducted. It may nevertheless be the case that a more powerful person
with benign motives imposes power in a way as to ensure that the less powerful
person is the gainer. On the other hand, Bentham would have been well aware of
examples of power used malevolently and of the evils brought about by abuse of
power, as was the case with the slave trade, child labour, poor relief, etc.
Likewise, he would surely have appreciated that malevolent power relations would
discredit the more powerful whereas benign relations would afford kudos and social
recognition.
At its extreme the more powerful person invokes compulsion and/or coercion,
possibly legitimated by statutory authority. At the other end of the scale, the more
powerful person may use assertive techniques selectively seeking to maintain the
relation while exercising judicious control of the person. The authority that entitles
the more powerful person to exercise this power may be self- assumed, effectively
abrogated by the less powerful person, socially accepted or legally acquired.
Agency practice (discussed in detail under Agency and Representation)
illustrates a particular kind of legally founded imposition in which the less powerful
person authorises the other to exercise power(s) on his/her behalf – power(s) that
he/she does not posses and/or cannot acquire and/or that may be in conflict with the
latter’s apparent wishes. Principals give agents authority to make such decisions or
take such actions on their behalf by operation of agency law. They do so basically
because they recognise that such agents ‘know best’ (or ‘can-do better’).
Modern guardianship under mental health legislation provides a fixed formula
arguably based on an assumed need for three imposed powers over wards
(‘patients’) namely, to determine their place of residence, their attendance (at
specific places) and to ensure that guardians have access to them.54 The flexibility
54 Section 7, Mental Health Act, 1983.
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required to ensure that this serves wards’ best interests and moves towards
empowerment is considerable. Research has shown that this is only be achieved in
practice by creative actions by guardian social workers.55
Turning to Empowerment, that might be described as a power relation in reverse,
it could be said that this applies where a more powerful person shares or ‘lends’
his/her power to a less powerful other. The latter gains strength by having the other’s
power to support him/her and is enabled to become ‘powerful enough’ to proceed
without the assistance of the other. The expression ‘power exchange’ has been coined to
describe such circumstances.56 Here the gainer is more clearly the less powerful person
(e.g. where gain includes becoming ‘more powerful’) but the more powerful person
may gain in a number of ways: his/her own satisfaction, social kudos or professional
recognition.
Arguably guardians can only empower wards if they themselves are empowered
by legitimate authority. The maxim that the legitimisation of power comes from
authority might not seem prerequisite for empowerment in the same way as it is
with imposed power. However, the difference is that the legitimisation of
empowerment proceeds from a different underlying assumption namely, that a less
powerful person only accepts the exercise of power by the other if the latter conveys
credibility and capability. In other words, the former is perceived by the other as acting
legitimately and as carrying authority, albeit of a personal kind.
Fiduciary dimensions
Contemporary uses of the word ‘fiduciary’ include adjectival descriptions of a wide
range of terms, i.e. law, doctrine, obligations, duties, principles and power, as well
as to describe a particular kind of relation between persons. This latter use of the term,
placing it within a relational context, is the main focus of this discussion. Nevertheless
it’s meaning remains elusive and an assessment that it possessed ‘a mystique only
beginning to melt’, would seem to have been optimistic.57 ‘A power [...] coupled with a
trust [...] is a fiduciary one’ is Bentham’s sole reference to ‘fiduciary’ in the
guardianship context, which seriously understates it as a central element in guardian-
55 B. E. Cox, Research on Guardianship for Mentally Ill Peopl e, London: Department of Health
Social Services Inspectorate, 1994.
56 P. M Blau, Exchange and Power in Social Life , Oxford, l986.
57 J. R. M. Gautreau, ‘Demystifying the Fiduciary Mystique’, Canadian Law Review, lxviii, p. 1.
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ward relations.58 Had he thought it necessary to support his key statement by reference
to the legal background to the fiduciary dimension this would no doubt have located it
within the province of Chancery and Equity.
Two main questions about the meaning of ‘fiduciary’ have troubled
commentators since Bentham: (1) what does the term mean as applied to interpersonal
relations; and (2) are there specific kinds of relations that are fiduciary by definition
(and if so, which) as opposed to a potentially limitless range of relations that may be or
become fiduciary in certain circumstances? Fortunately, these questions can be
addressed, separately and in turn, while shedding further light on Bentham’s position.
Theories underpinning the nature of fiduciary relations mainly seek to explain the
application of fiduciary law per se to business and commercial dealings. Few of these
theories are of relevant application to guardianship (or other fiduciary relations) other
than Reliance Theory, described as ‘[...] perhaps the most basic of all [...] and most
commonly cited’.59 In applying this theory, Shepherd states that ‘a fiduciary
relationship exists where one person reposes trust, confidence or reliance in another [...]
to the knowledge of that other’60 adding that this gives rise to a state of vulnerability, i.e.
‘the relative vulnerability [present whenever] one party has dominance or influence
over another party, which dominance is based upon a confidence reposed in him by
that party’.61
Elsewhere, in place of ‘dominance and influence’ Sheppard comes closer to
Bentham’s position in saying that ‘it is the power within the relationship which creates
the vulnerability’62 and that the fiduciary (the term used here as a noun) therefore has
‘a duty to utilise that power in the best interest of the other’.63 Interestingly, Goodin’s
thesis is that society’s obligations to the socially vulnerable, i.e. persons ‘vulnerable to
avoidable harm’, needs also to confront the vulnerability arising from dependence on
more powerful others to reduce the impact of that harm.64 From this standpoint, a more
apt name for Reliance Theory would be Reliance-Dependence-Vulnerability Theory.
At first sight, Sheppard seems to undermine the credibility of reliance theory by
58 IPML, p. 238.
59 J. C. Shepherd, The Law of Fiduciaries , Toronto, l981, p. 56.
60 Ibid., p. 56.
61 Ibid., p. 57.
62 Ibid., p. 85.
63 Ibid., p. 85.
64 Goodin, Protecting the Vulnerable.
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saying that it is derived from a principle’ [...] taken out of thin air, an ethical or moral
imperative [...] untestable within the confines of the legal system’.65 However,
Bentham may well have retorted that these moral and ethical perspectives are as valid
as a purely legal approach. Moreover, Sheppard himself later reminds us’ [...] not to
lose sight of the moral foundation upon which many of our legal rules have been
erected, including those in the area of fiduciaries.’ 66
On the second question posed above, Gautreau can be cited as typical of a
modern commentator who argues that whether or when fiduciary obligations apply
does not depend on the existence of identifiable classes of relationships.67 Although
solicitor-client, trustee-beneficiary, principal-agent and guardian-ward are all
examples of generally agreed fiduciary relations, he maintains that ‘It is the nature of
the relationship [the particular undertakings between the parties] rather than the
category of the actor involved that gives rise to the duty’.68 The alternative view, and
one that fits better with Bentham’s guardianship, is that guardian-ward relations
exemplify a class of relations that are fiduciary by definition (i.e. not dependent on
characteristics of any given relation between the parties).
In fact we find that Bentham’s actual description of obligations within
guardianship is essentially consistent with a specifically identified fiduciary relation.
Guardians serve the best interests of wards and are obligated to represent their wards’
interests—not the possibly conflicting interests of others, i.e. of the guardians
themselves or third parties. Being in a fiduciary relation with their wards means that
they are ‘duty bound’ to put the interests of wards first. Therefore wards’ trust, confidence
and reliance on guardians are essential preconditions, together with the associated
vulnerability of both kinds described above. The difficulty of squaring these
principles with the basis upon which guardians operate, i.e. on a free-standing basis
or within agencies, was discussed earlier in the context of how guardians are selected.
Such a stringent definition of fiduciary relations might suggest that guardians as
fiduciaries were not expected to have interests of their own, but this does not follow
from Bentham’s exposition. Most obviously, guardians would have normal human
65 Shepherd, Law of Fiduciaries, p. 57.
66 Ibid., p. 60.
67 Gautreau, ‘The Fiduciary Mystique’, p. 1.
68 Ibid., p. 5. Gautreau’s article needs to be read in context, namely as a commentary on current trends, the
general thrust of which is not here challenged.
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interests possibly as parents (of their own offspring well as possibly of wards). And, as
has been mentioned apropos trusts, guardians may attain the ‘privilege’ (kudos) that
being a trustee affords. Their other legitimate interests would include ensuring the
effectiveness and integrity of their role as guardians and maintaining the credibility of
the institution, matters that will sooner or later further ward’s interests.
Overall it can be said that guardian-ward relations defined as fiduciary
highlight special requirements of personal care, and indicate the way responsibility of
one person for a vulnerable other is exercised, a consideration notably absent from
Blackstone’s account. Taken together with ‘a duty of care’ (part of common law of
tort rather than law of fiduciaries), these elements are judged to under-lie the primary
care responsibility within guardian-ward relations.
Although power and fiduciary dimensions have been separately described it is
obviously important that they combine together in practice. As a fiduciary relation, the
impact of the power dimension means that guardians need to exercise imposed
power ‘over’ their wards appropriately, i.e. to ensure the latter’s protection and
representation. By this measure, inappropriate use of power would include meeting
the guardian’s rather than the ward’s needs, e.g. simply to make his/her task easier.
Power exercised in the fiduciary relation substitutes equitably for that person’s ‘lack
of power’ and furthers that person’s interests.
Bringing together the fiduciary and power dimensions within guardian-ward
relations ensures that: (a) power relations are modified by fiduciary imperatives; and (b)
that the fiduciary relation is supported by beneficial power(s). Seemingly it is this
intermix that gives guardian-ward relations their distinct character.
Conclusions
Without due allowance for the limited scope of Bentham’s exposition, students of
guardianship could be justified in criticising the net result for being a-historical,
non-empirical and lacking in vision. It is the case that the account did not: review
guardianship’s long and complex history; provide evidence of what was actually
happening (the size of the issue or the need or the resources to meet it); or put
forward recommendations or predictions as to necessary future needs or
developments. On the other hand, it is also the case that there were additional reasons
UCL Bentham Project
Journal of Bentham Studies, vol. 11 (2009)
24
for the absence of these considerations in Bentham’s account and these are now
briefly reviewed.
Whether or not Bentham intended his discussion to begin from a ‘clean sheet’
he demonstrated that starting afresh had substantial advantages: clearing the
ground meant that he and his readers were not loaded with ‘baggage’ (precedent,
status of previous commentators) thereby enabling the subject to be looked at afresh.
In general, the value of a historical approach is to help explain the present and to
intelligently predict the future. Arguably, Blackstone’s concentration on archaic
guardianship categories did not succeed in either of these objectives because his
account effectively blurred the distinction between past and present, i.e. where ‘the
present’ is described and reviewed in terms of prevailing laws, social and economic
conditions. In this he was faced with the perennial problem shared with his
contemporaries of how to provide a complete and realistic picture without available
supporting evidence.
Bentham would not have been in a better position than Blackstone if he had
sought to review the state of existing guardianship law or argue for the need for change
because neither commentator could have accessed the facts of the situation. For
instance, there was no centrally collected data on the working of the Tenures
Abolition Act, 1660, (the formalisation of guardianship of children and adults), that
could have been cited to indicate numbers of guardianships or proportions of
different categories of wards.69 Nor was there nationally collected information on
local practice, such as the extent of use made of borough guardianships, i.e.
guardianships framed around laws made by the boroughs themselves.70
Had Bentham written in depth on guardianship, and therefore, had he sought to
present factual evidence for his views in the way he did on other subjects, a realistic
assessment of the beneficial impact of guardianship could perhaps have been made.
Of course a full treatment would have been more likely to convince his readers of
the social value of guardian-ward relations, both as being of real beneficial value to
wards and as benefiting society as a whole. Nevertheless, providing hard data alone
would have been insufficient to support these contentions because deciding ‘who
benefits?’ from any given arrangement or measure in any particular context
69 12 Car. II. c.24.
70 M. Bateson, Borough Customs, London, 1904.
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depends on who makes the judgement and from which standpoint. Taking a different
example, that of the slave trade, we could conclude that it was the slave owners and
traders who enjoyed beneficial relations. Moreover, Bentham would have been first to
appreciate how unsafe is to assume that simply because some more powerful others
have legal duties or moral obligations to benefit the less powerful that this describes
actual outcomes.
Overall, however, Bentham seems to have been less interested in guardianship law
per se than whether it provided an ethical framework within and beyond the family
nexus. This standpoint is judged to effectively circumscribe the nub of the issue so
far as this article is concerned: the nature of guardian-ward relations beyond formal
legal definition, though Bentham’s location of his discussion within ‘Division of
Offences’ (rather than ‘Law of Persons’, as had Blackstone) did not help to advance
his argument. It is contended that notwithstanding the absence of empirical evidence
there are other ways Bentham demonstrates the value of guardian-ward relations, and
these are now briefly reviewed. Finally, some observations are offered on current
developments that confirm their value.
Although Bentham’s achievement has not been recognised his exposition
reached the heart of the guardianship concept, namely the guardian-ward nexus as a
distinct kind of fiduciary relationship. This demonstrated that combining the trust
basis for protection and the agency basis for representation provided the best
prospect for serving wards’ best interests. He also paved the way for establishing a
basic principle as to the time-span of guardianship, namely that guardianships should last
till no longer required when earlier termination was inappropriate. Seemingly,
Bentham left others to ponder on how these findings could be enshrined in future
legal reform.
Similarly the importance of Bentham’s major advance in providing the
grounding for a generic criteria for guardianship (i.e., common to both youngsters and
mentally disordered persons), has yet to be recognised. It is tempting to combine this
with Goodin’s vulnerability analysis in recognising that the essential common
‘incapacitating’ feature of some putative wards (irrespective of age) is their
vulnerability to harm and to being dependent for their happiness on guardians. The
‘three-dimensional’ way of viewing wards’ and their situations—suggested by
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Bentham’s terminology and developed conceptually by May—enables us to see them
as individuals, as social beings and as physical persons.71 Vulnerability within these
areas calls both for protection and representation, hence Bentham’s insistence on the
fiduciary basis of guardian- ward relations.
Because the main focus in this paper has been on one-to-one relations, public
policy issues per se have received less attention but Bentham would undoubtedly
have been concerned that guardianship also serves the interests of communities and
society as a whole. Arguably, prerequisite to this is maintaining the credibility of the
institution as a necessary and ethical way to protect and represent the needs of socially
vulnerable groups. A major contributor to this aim is the maintenance of the integrity
of guardians, both in a legal and social sense. Bentham’s exposition, including his
reference to guardians who abuse their position, clearly pointed to the need for some
kind of group identity, shared values, code of conduct and common skills among
guardians. To support these proposals there should be added an efficient administrative
system with accepted procedures for assessment and for initial agreement on ‘terms of
reference’.
The necessity of both the protective and representational needs of vulnerable
groups have been better recognised since Bentham’s time, and the growth of welfare
provision and latterly of social services has transformed how these are provided. These
objectives have been integrated into social policy agendas and contributed to
comprehensive statutory frameworks. Whereas it could be said that guardianship has
been absorbed into the legislative paradigm at the expense of attention to its essential
relational core, many services now have an explicitly protective function and are
sometime themselves viewed as a form of guardianship.72
The representational function has fared less well in this respect than
protection. This is a particular area of current concern in residential care where
prioritising a safe environment and providing overall protection can work against an
individual’s representational needs. Recent studies of elder abuse have found
residents of care homes being physically restrained, not for their own sake but to
71 May, Existential Psychotherapy.
72 T. Apolloni and T. P. Cooke, A New Look at Guardianship, Baltimore, 1984. Indicatively, the authors
subtitled their work: ‘Protective Services that Support Personalized Living’.
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maintain a relatively tranquil and compliant regime.73 To counter this trend it is being
argued that the representational role needs reasserting more strongly, and that
independent guardians need to have powers to intervene effectively on behalf of those
unable to speak up for themselves.74 These suggestions, taken together with Bentham’s
insights into the meaning of fiduciary relations, highlight the unresolved question,
discussed above, as to whether guardians’ full accountability to their wards is
compatible with accountability to others in authority such as an employing agency.
Overall it is contended that because Bentham’s ‘relational’ starting point was right,
his formulation answers questions as to guardianship’s purpose and function that are
as relevant to-day as they were in Bentham’s time, albeit in a very different social
environment. Sufficient has hopefully been said to answer our original question
positively: in the absence of empirical evidence that wards benefited from
guardianship, it is maintained that Bentham’s account did provide a firm foundation
for believing that such benefit was being realised and/or that benefit would be realised if
his important ethical and legal requirements as to the structure and function of
guardian-ward relations were adhered to.
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